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Abstract Recently, a broadcasting multiple blind signature scheme based
on quantum teleportation has been proposed for the first time. It is claimed
to have unconditional security and properties of quantum multiple signature
and quantum blind signature. In this paper, we analyze the security of the
protocol and show that each signatory can learn the signed message by a single
particle measurement and the signed message can be modified at random by
any attacker according to the scheme. Furthermore, there are some participant
attacks and external attacks existing in the scheme. Finally we present an
improved scheme and show that it can resist all of the mentioned attacks.
Additionally, the secret keys can be used again and again, making it more
efficient and practical.
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1 Introduction
Quantum signature is the counterpart in the quantum world of classical digi-
tal signature. Most classical digital signature schemes are based on public key
cryptography which can be broken by Shor’s algorithm [1]. Quantum signature,
which is based on the laws of quantum physics, can provide us unconditional
security. Many different quantum signature models are proposed for differ-
ent application demands, such as arbitrated quantum signature [2,3,4,5,6,7],
quantum proxy signature [8,9,10,11], quantum group signature [12,13,14,15],
quantum blind signature [16,17,18] and quantum multiple signature [19,20].
A secure quantum signature scheme should satisfy the following two ba-
sic requirements: (1) No forgery. Specifically, the signature cannot be forged
by any illegal signatory. (2) No disavowal. The signatory cannot disavow his
signature and the receiver cannot disavow his receiving it. Furthermore, the
receiver cannot disavow the integrity of the signature [4].
As quantum cryptography has developed, many cryptanalysis of existing
protocols have been presented [21,22,23,24,25,26,27]. Some effective attack
strategies also have been proposed to eavesdrop in the existing quantum cryp-
tography protocols [28], such as intercept-resend attacks [29], entanglement
swapping attacks [30,31,32], teleportation attacks [33,34], dense-coding at-
tacks [35,36,37], channel-loss attacks [38,39], denial-of-service attacks [40,41],
correlation−extractability attacks [42,43,44], Trojan horse attacks [45,46,47,
48], participant attacks [49] and collaborate attacks [50]. Understanding these
attacks is very important for designing quantum signature schemes with higher
security. It also advances the research in quantum signature. Zou and Qiu [4]
analyzed the arbitrated quantum signatures based on GHZ states and Bell
states, finding that the receiver Bob can successfully reject the signature by
disavowing its integrity. Then they proposed a new scheme by using a public
board to fix this security loophole in which the entanglement was not needed
any more.
Gao et al. [21] gave a perfect cryptanalysis on existing arbitrated quantum
signature. They found that the signature can be forged by the receiver at will in
almost all the existing AQS schemes and the sender can disavow the signature
just by an intercept-resend method. Due to the existence of serious loopholes, it
is imperative to reexamine the security of other quantum signature protocols.
Recently, a broadcasting multiple blind quantum signature scheme based
on quantum teleportation has been proposed in Ref. [51]. It is said to have the
properties of both quantum multiple signature and quantum blind signature.
Here we show that it is not a real blind signature because the signatory can
get the content of the signed message. In addition, the signed message can
be modified at random by any attacker. Moreover, there are some participant
attacks and external attacks existing in the scheme. For instance, the message
sender Alice can impersonate Ui successfully as she can get the content of
the signature and Ui’s secret key KCUi . Moreover, Alice can sign arbitrary
message at will. The signature collector Charlie can counterfeit the signature
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optionally. With respect to the external attacks, the eavesdropper Eve can
forge Ui’s signature at will without knowing the secret key KCUi .
All the attack strategies are described in detail and finally we present an
improved scheme which can resist all the mentioned attacks. Meanwhile, since
all the secret keys can be reused, it may greatly increase the scheme’s efficiency
and make it more practical.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we review
the original protocol briefly. In Section 3 we present the security analysis of
the original protocol and describe the attack strategies in detail. In Section 4
we present an improved scheme and analyze its security by showing that the
improved one can resist all the attacks mentioned above and that the keys can
be used again and again. In Section 5 a short conclusion is given and an issue
worthy on further research is proposed.
2 Review of the original protocol [51]
The protocol involves the following four characters: (1) Alice is the message
sender. (2) Ui is the i-th member of broadcasting multiple signatory. (3) Char-
lie is the signature collector. (4) Bob is the receiver and the verifier of the
broadcasting multiple blind signature.
The scheme is composed of three parts: the initial phase, the individual
blind signature generation and verification phase, and the combined multiple
blind signature verification phase.
In this scheme, Alice sends t copies of n-bit classical message m to t signa-
tories Ui (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) respectively, then Ui signs the message m to get the
blind signature Si and sends Si to Charlie. Charlie collects and verifies these
blind signatures, then he constructs a multiple signature and sends it to Bob.
Finally, Bob verifies the multiple signature by confirming the message.
(1) Initial phase
(1.1) Alice transforms the classical message m into n-bit as
m = m(1)||m(2)|| · · · ||m(j)|| · · · ||m(n), (1)
m(j) = 0 or m(j) = 1,
j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(1.2) Quantum key distribution
Alice shares a secret key KAB with Bob, a secret key KAC with Charlie,
and secret keys KAUi (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) with each signatory Ui, respectively.
Bob shares a secret key KBC with Charlie, Charlie shares secret keys KCUi
(i = 1, 2, · · · , t) with each signatory Ui respectively. To obtain unconditional
security, all these keys are distributed via QKD protocols.
(1.3) Alice sends ECKAB (m) to Bob
Here EC means classical one-time pad algorithm,
ECKAB (m) = KAB ⊕m. (2)
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E
Q
K in the later means quantum one-time pad
E
Q
K(|P 〉) =
n⊗
i=1
σk2i−1x σ
k2i
z |Pi〉, (3)
K is a secret key with |K| = 2n, Ki is the K’s i-bit. |P 〉 is an n-bit quantum
message, |Pi〉 is its i-bit. σx and σz are two Pauli operators.
(2) The individual blind signature generation and verification phase
In this phase, we pick one of the signatory Ui as the representative who
signs the message.
(2.1) Message transformation
Assume that Alice is to send the message m. She prepares n-qubit state
|ψ(m)〉M as
|ψ(m)〉M =
n⊗
j=1
|ψ(j)〉M , (4)
where
|ψ(j)〉M =
{
1√
2
(|0〉M + |1〉M ) if m(j) = 1
1√
2
(|0〉M − |1〉M ) if m(j) = 0.
(5)
(2.2) Quantum channel setup
Alice prepares n EPR pairs. Each pair is denoted as
|a(j)〉AC = 1√
2
(|00〉AC + |11〉AC), j = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n+ l. (6)
(2.3) Signature Phase
(2.3.1) Alice picks up her n EPR particles denoted as {|ϕ(N)〉A}, i.e.
{|ϕ(N)〉A} = {|ϕ(1)〉A, |ϕ(2)〉A, · · · , |ϕ(j)〉A, · · · , |ϕ(n)〉A}, (7)
and the other n EPR particles denoted as {|ϕ(N)〉C}, i.e.
{|ϕ(N)〉C} = {|ϕ(1)〉C , |ϕ(2)〉C , · · · , |ϕ(j)〉C , · · · , |ϕ(n)〉C}. (8)
(2.3.2) To distinguish each signatory, Alice creates a unique serial number
which is denoted as SN attaching to {|ϕ(N)〉A}. Since SN is a classical string,
Alice transfers it to a quantum state sequence |SN〉 with the basis BZ =
{|0〉, |1〉}. Then she sends EQKAUi (|ψ(N)〉MA, |SN〉) to Ui. Here
|ψ〉MA =
n⊗
j=1
|ψ(j)〉M ⊗ |ϕ(j)〉A. (9)
After that, Alice sends EQKAC ({|ϕ(N)〉C}, |SN〉) to Charlie.
(2.3.3) Ui decrypts E
Q
KAUi
(|ψ〉MA, |SN〉) to get |ψ〉MA and |SN〉, then he
performs Bell-basis measurement to get the outcomes {βMA(j)|j = 1, 2, · · · , n}.
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Each βMA(j) = βkl(k, l ∈ {0, 1}) is expressed by 2-bit string kl according to
|βkl〉 7→ kl. Then he gets Si as
Si = βMA(1)||βMA(2)|| · · · ||βMA(j)|| · · · ||βMA(n). (10)
(2.3.4) Ui sends E
C
KCUi
(Si, SN) to Charlie.
(2.4) Verification Phase
(2.4.1) Charlie decrypts ECKCUi
(Si, SN)to get the signature Si and SN .
(2.4.2) According to Si, SN and quantum teleportation, Charlie performs
one of the corresponding reverse transformation (I,X, Y, Z) on each particle
|ϕ(j)〉C in his hand to get |ψ′(j)〉C . He obtains |ψ′(m)〉C as
|ψ′(m)〉C =
n⊗
j=1
|ψ′(j)〉C . (11)
(2.4.3) Charlie getsm′ by measuring each |ψ′(j)〉 in the basis of { 1√
2
(|0〉M+
|1〉M ), 1√2 (|0〉M − |1〉M )}. Then he sends ECKBC (m′) to Bob.
(2.4.4) Bob decrypts ECKBC (m
′), ECKAB (m) by the secret keys KBC and
KAB respectively and comparesm withm
′. If they are the same, Si is accepted.
Otherwise, it is rejected.
(3) The combined multiple signature generation and verification phase
(3.1) Charlie collects all individual signatures to generate the multiple sig-
nature S = {Si|i = 1, 2, · · · , t} and generates the message {m′i|i = 1, 2, · · · , t}.
If m′i is equal to m
′
i+1 (i = 1, 2, · · · , t− 1), he confirms the message and sends
ECKBC (m
′
1) to Bob. If it is not equal, the process is terminated.
(3.2) After Bob decrypts ECKBC (m
′
1) and E
C
KAB
(m), he accepts S if m′1 is
equal to m, otherwise he terminates the process.
3 Cryptanalysis of the original protocol
In this section, we point out that there are some security loopholes in the
scheme in Ref. [51] and describe the corresponding attack strategies in detail.
3.1 Each Ui can learn the signed message m
The scheme is claimed to have properties of quantum blind signature so that
the signatory cannot learn the signed message. Here we show that each signa-
tory Ui can get the message just by a single particle measurement.
Suppose Alice wants to send an n-bit classical messagem to get Ui’s signa-
ture, according to the scheme, she will transform it into n-qubit state |ψ(m)〉M
according to Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). Because 1√
2
(|0〉M+|1〉M ) and 1√2 (|0〉M−|1〉M )
are orthogonal to each other, they can form an orthonormal basis of the two
dimensional Hilbert Space. When Ui gets K
Q
AUi
(|ψ(m)〉MA) from Alice in the
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signature phase, he can decrypt it and perform a single particle measurement
in the basis of { 1√
2
(|0〉M+ |1〉M ), 1√2 (|0〉M−|1〉M )} on the first state to get the
message m, which has no effect on the following process. From this problem,
we can see the original scheme is not a real blind signature scheme.
3.2 Any attacker can modify Message m at random
Here we show the signed message m can be modified at random through the
intercept-resend method by any attacker, including participant attackers or
external attackers.
In the original scheme, message m and m′ are encrypted according to the
one-time pad encryption algorithm during their transmission. Any attacker can
intercept ECKAB (m) and resend E
C
KAB
(m)⊕m0 to Bob in Step (1.3). According
to the scheme, Bob will getm⊕m0 instead ofm, herem0 is an arbitrary 2n-bit
random binary string. At the same time, he intercepts ECKBC (m
′) and resends
ECKBC (m
′) ⊕m0 in Step (2.4.3). According to the scheme, m ⊕m0 can pass
the following verification process. Because m0 is arbitrary, m can be modified
at random by any attacker through intercept-resend method.
3.3 Alice’s attack
To illustrate Alice’s attack, here take a 1-bit message m(j) to make a demon-
stration.
3.3.1 Alice can get the signature
Suppose Alice sends the message m(j) to get Ui’s blind signature Si(j). From
the scheme, we can see that Ui signs m(j) by measuring |ψ(j)〉MA in the Bell
basis, which is sent from Alice in Step(2.3.3). Alice can get Si(j) = βkl by
measuring |ψ(j)〉MA on Bell basis and recording the outcome βkl before she
sends it to Ui. Instead, Alice sends the two particle state |βkl〉MA to Ui. Then
Ui’s measurement outcome is βkl. Then Alice can get each Si(j).
3.3.2 Alice can get Ui’s secret key KCUi
It has been illustrated that Alice can get each Si(j), then Alice can get Ui’s
signature Si. Alice can intercept E
C
KCUi
(Si)||SN when it is sent from Ui to
Charlie in Step (2.3.4). Because Alice knows Si, she can extract Ui’s secret
key KCUi by adding Si to E
C
KCUi
(Si) as KCUi = Si ⊕ ECKCUi (Si). Then she
resends ECKCUi
(Si)||SN to Charlie. All of these cannot be discovered.
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3.3.3 Alice can sign the message at will
We can see that Alice can completely replace the signatory Ui to sign the
message. In order to illustrate Alice can sign arbitrary message at will, we
will demonstrate the quantum teleportation process of the above protocol as
follows:
Suppose that the particle M carry a 1-bit classical information m(j) and
the state of particle M are denoted as
|ψ(j)〉M = 1√
2
(|0〉M + d|1〉M ), d = ±1. (12)
The EPR pairs shared between Alice and Charlie are denoted as
|a(j)〉AC = 1√
2
(|00〉AC + |11〉AC). (13)
The two states are combined to form a three particle state |Φ(j)〉 as
|Φ(j)〉 = |ψ(j)〉M ⊗ |a(j)〉AC (14)
= (
|0〉M + d|1〉M√
2
)(
|00〉AC + |11〉AC√
2
)
=
1
2
[|β00〉MA( |0〉C + d|1〉C√
2
) + |β01〉MA( |1〉C + d|0〉C√
2
)
+|β10〉MA( |0〉C − d|1〉C√
2
) + |β11〉MA( |1〉C − d|0〉C√
2
)],
where
|β00〉MA = |00〉MA + |11〉MA√
2
, (15)
|β01〉MA = |01〉MA + |10〉MA√
2
, (16)
|β10〉MA = |00〉MA − |11〉MA√
2
, (17)
and |β11〉MA = |01〉MA − |10〉MA√
2
. (18)
From Eq. (14), we can see if the measurement outcome is β00, the state of
the particle C is just the information state |ψ(j)〉M . Then we take operation
I on the state of C. If the measurement outcome is β01, then we perform
operation X on C to recover it to the information state. If the outcomes are
β10 and β11, then we take the operation Z and Y respectively.
Here, we show Alice can modify the signature Si(j) at random as follows:
When Alice prepares |ψ(j)〉M and |a(j)〉AC in Step (2.1) and Step (2.2), she
does not send |ϕ(j)〉C to Charlie and |ψ(j)〉MA to Ui immediately. Instead,
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she performs a Bell-basis measurement on |ψ(j)〉MA to get the outcome βkl
and she sends another Bell state |βk′l′〉MA to Ui. Then the signature Si(j) =
βkl has been changed into S
′
i(j) = βk′l′ . In order to make sure S
′
i(j) can
pass the verification, Alice performs a corresponding operator V on |ϕ(j)〉C
before sending it to Charlie. Alice can derive the corresponding operator V
according to Eq. (14). Assume |ψ(j)〉M is teleported from Alice to Charlie
and the measurement outcome is βkl. Also using this equation, Charlie will
performs a Pauli operator V1 on |ϕ(j)〉C to make sure
V1|ϕ(j)〉C ≡ |ψ(j)〉M . (19)
In other words, the particle C is in the state
|ϕ(j)〉C ≡ V1|ψ(j)〉M . (20)
Here A ≡ B means A is equivalent to B except for a global phase. Alice
performs the corresponding V on |ϕ(j)〉C , so
|ϕ(j)〉C ≡ V †V1|ψ(j)〉M . (21)
Here V † is the conjugate transpose of V . When Si(j) is changed into S′i(j),
Charlie will take another Pauli operator V2 on |ϕ(j)〉C to return it to the
information state |ψ(j)〉M , then
|ϕ(j)〉C ≡ V2V †V1|ψ(j)〉M ≡ |ψ(j)〉M . (22)
From Eq. (22), we can conclude that
V2V
†V1 = I or V = V1V2. (23)
We take a simple example to make an illustration. Suppose Alice get the
measurement outcome β00, but she sends |β01〉AM to Ui, according to Eq. (14),
V1 = I, V2 = X , then V = X according to Eq. (23). We list Alice’s attack
strategies in Table 1.
3.4 Charlie’s attack
In the original scheme, Charlie can also attack the program by modifying the
signature S at will.
Charlie is the signature collector whose duty is to collect all the individual
signature Si(i = 1, 2, · · · , t) and extract m′i by first recovering each |ϕ(j)〉C
to |ψ′(j)〉C according to Eq. (14) and then measuring |ψ′(m)〉C in the basis
of { 1√
2
(|0〉M + |1〉M ), 1√2 (|0〉M − |1〉M )}. Charlie can modify the signature S
into arbitrary S′ and keep the message m′1 unchanged after confirming the
message. Because Bob just verifies whether m is equal to m′1 or not, S
′ can
pass the verification without being discovered.
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Si(j) = βkl → S
′
i
(j) = βk′l′ V1 V2 V
Si(j) = β00 → S′i(j) = β01 I X X
Si(j) = β00 → S′i(j) = β10 I Z Z
Si(j) = β00 → S
′
i
(j) = β11 I Y Y
Si(j) = β01 → S
′
i
(j) = β00 X I X
Si(j) = β01 → S
′
i
(j) = β10 X Z Y
Si(j) = β01 → S′i(j) = β11 X Y Z
Si(j) = β10 → S′i(j) = β00 Z I Z
Si(j) = β10 → S′i(j) = β01 Z X Y
Si(j) = β10 → S′i(j) = β11 Z Y X
Si(j) = β11 → S′i(j) = β00 Y I Y
Si(j) = β11 → S
′
i
(j) = β01 Y X Z
Si(j) = β11 → S
′
i
(j) = β10 Y Z X
Table 1 Alice’s attack strategies: First, Alice measures |ψ(j)〉MA to get Si(j) = βkl, but
she sends |βk′l′ 〉MA to Ui instead. Then the signature Si(j) has been changed into S
′
i
(j).
At the same time, Alice performs a corresponding unitary operation V on |ϕ(j)〉C before
sending it to Charlie.
3.5 Eavesdropper Eve’s forgery attack
In Ref. [51], it is declared that the eavesdropper Eve can’t forge Ui’s signa-
ture on the assumption that she can get Ui’s secret key KCUi because of the
quantum teleportation. Here we show that Eve can forge Ui’s signature at will
even though she knows nothing about the Ui’s key KCUi .
Here we take a 1-bit message m(j) to make a demonstration. This is an
imcomplete message m(j) whose signature is Si(j). Eve replaced Si(j) with
another S′i(j) when it is sent from Ui to Charlie. Then Charlie will recover
the message according to S′i(j) based on teleportation. Suppose the signature
Si(j) is β00. It is changed into S
′
i(j) = β01 under Eve’s attack. We take an
illustration as follows:
(1) Without Eve’s attack
Suppose the signature Si(j) is β00 and Charlie’s particle C is in the state
|ϕ(j)〉C = 1√
2
(|0〉C + d|1〉C), d = ±1. (24)
Then Charlie will perform I on his particle to recover it to the information
state |ψ′(j)〉C according to Eq. (14), here
|ψ′(j)〉C = I|ϕ(j)〉C = 1√
2
(|0〉C + d|1〉C). (25)
After that Charlie measures it and extracts the message m′(j) as
m′(j) =
{
1 if d = 1
0 if d = 0.
(26)
(2) With Eve’s attack
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The signature is tampered with S′i(j) = β01 with Eve’s attack, Charlie will
perform X on his particle C which is still in the state of Eq. (24). Then the
state of C will be
|ψ′(j)〉C = X |ϕ(j)〉C = 1√
2
(|1〉C + d|0〉C). (27)
After that, Charlie measures |ψ′(j)〉C to extract the message m′′(j) as
m′′(j) =
{
1 if d = 1
0 if d = 0.
(28)
From Eq. (26) and Eq. (28), we can see Charlie will get the same messages,
i.e., m′′(j) = m′(j). See the list of all the cases in Table 2.
Si(j) = βkl → S
′
i
(j) = βk′l′ m
′′(j) and m′(j)
Si(j) = β00 → S′i(j) = β01 m
′′(j) = m′(j)
Si(j) = β00 → S′i(j) = β10 m
′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β00 → S
′
i
(j) = β11 m′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β01 → S
′
i
(j) = β00 m′′(j) = m′(j)
Si(j) = β01 → S
′
i
(j) = β10 m′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β01 → S
′
i
(j) = β11 m′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β10 → S′i(j) = β00 m
′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β10 → S′i(j) = β01 m
′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β10 → S′i(j) = β11 m
′′(j) = m′(j)
Si(j) = β11 → S′i(j) = β00 m
′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β11 → S
′
i
(j) = β01 m′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1
Si(j) = β11 → S
′
i
(j) = β10 m′′(j) = m′(j)
Table 2 The relation between m′(j) and m′′(j) under the circumstance that the signature
Si(j) is tampered with by S
′
i
(j) under Eve’s attack.
From the second column of Table 2, we can see β00 and β01 are inter-
changeable and so is the β10 and β11. Specifically, when Eve tampered with
Si(j) = β00(β10) by S
′
i(j) = β01(β11) or vice versa, Charlie will extract the
same message. Precisely, m′(j) is equal to m′′(j). Accordingly, S′i(j) can al-
ways pass the verification. Eve’s other modification of the signature is not inter-
changeable. We can see all the other cases get different messagem′′(j) 6= m′(j),
but they all satisfy m′′(j) = m′(j)⊕ 1 where ⊕ is modulo 2 addition.
From Table 2, we can make a law of the message and its corresponding
signature as follows:
If the signature Si(j) = βkl is changed into S
′
i(j) = βk′l′ , then their corre-
sponding messages m′(j) and m′′(j) (k, k′, l, l′ ∈ {0, 1} j = 1, 2, · · · , n) will
satisfy
m′′(j) =
{
m′(j) if k = k′
m′(j)⊕ 1 if k 6= k′. (29)
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Next we show Eve can forge each signature Si by the intercept-resend
method. Eve can intercept ECKCUi
(Si) when it is sent from Ui to Charlie. She
adds a 2n-bit binary string
l = i1i2 · · · i2n (30)
to ECKCUi
(Si) and sends it to Charlie. Then Charlie will get
S′i = Si ⊕ l. (31)
Charlie will recover the information m′′ based on S′i according to the telepor-
tation rather than Si. Then Charlie will get
m′′ = m′ ⊕ l′, (32)
where
l′ = j1j2 · · · jn. (33)
According to Eq. (29), l′ must satisfy
jk =
{
0 if i2k−1 = 0
1 if i2k−1 = 1.
(34)
At the same time, Eve intercepts ECKAB (m) in the Step (1.3) and resends
ECKAB (m) ⊕ l′ to Bob. Then Bob will get m ⊕ l′ instead of m. S′i will be
accepted for the signature of m⊕ l′. We can see that Eve’s forgery attack can
get successful.
4 An improved scheme
Here we present an improved scheme and show it can resist all the attacks men-
tioned above. Also the secret keys can be reused which can provide efficiency
and practicality.
Before we present the improved scheme, it is necessary to introduce the
QOTP algorithm it uses. Suppose a quantum message
|P 〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|Pj〉 (35)
is composed of n qubits
|Pj〉 = αj |0〉+ βj|1〉, (36)
where
|αj |2 + |βj |2 = 1 (37)
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and the encryption key K ∈ {0, 1}4n. The QOTP encryption EK used in this
scheme on the quantum message can be described as
EK(|P 〉) =
n⊗
j=1
σK4jx σ
K4j−1
z Tσ
K4j−2
x σ
K4j−3
z |Pj〉 (38)
where
T =
i√
3
(σx − σy + σz). (39)
This QOTP encryption EK is the improved one introduced in Ref. [52] for
the first time. The assistant operator T can make sure the encrypted message
can not be forged in the scheme. Distinctly, for arbitrary message |P 〉, there
are no non-identity unitary V and unitary U such that
E
†
KV EK |P 〉 ≡ U |P 〉. (40)
In order to make the secret keys reusable in the improved scheme, we use
a one-way hash function here [7]:
H(x) : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}4n. (41)
This scheme also contains four factors: (1) Alice is the message sender. (2)
Ui (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) is the i-th member of broadcasting multiple signatory. (3)
Charlie is the signature collector. (4) Bob is the receiver and the verifier of the
broadcasting multiple blind signature.
The improved scheme is also composed of three parts: the initial phase, the
individual blind signature generation and verification phase, and the combined
multiple blind signature verification phase.
(1) Initial Phase
(1.1) Quantum key distribution
Alice shares the secret key KAB with Bob, KAC with Charlie, and KAUi
(i = 1, 2, · · · , t) with each signatory Ui; Bob shares a secret key KBC with
Charlie; Charlie shares secret keys KCUi (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) with each signatory
Ui. All the secret keys are 4n-bit. To obtain unconditional security, all these
keys are distributed via QKD protocols.
(1.2) Message concealing and message transformation
Alice gets m′ = m⊕ r where m is an n-bit classical message and r an n-bit
random binary string. Alice transforms the classical message m′ into n-qubit
state
|ψ(m′)〉M =
n⊗
j=1
|ψ(j)〉M , (42)
where
|ψ(j)〉M =
{
b|0〉M + c|1〉M if m′(j) = 1
c|0〉M − b|1〉M if m′(j) = 0,
(43)
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b, c are different real constants.
(1.3) Alice sends the message m to Bob
Alice transforms m into |m〉 as
|m〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|m(j)〉, (44)
where
|m(j)〉 =
{
|0〉 if m(j) = 0
|1〉 if m(j) = 1. (45)
Alice randomly chooses a 4n-bit binary sequence r0, computes H(KAB||r0),
and sends [EH(KAB ||r0)(|m〉)]⊗ |r0〉 to Bob where
|r0〉 =
4n⊗
j=1
|r0(j)〉, (46)
and
|r0(j)〉 =
{
|0〉 if r0(j) = 0
|1〉 if r0(j) = 1.
(47)
Bob extracts r0 by measuring each particle of |r0〉 in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}.
Then he can compute H(KAB||r0) and decrypt EH(KAB ||r0)(|m〉) to get |m〉.
After that he can get m by performing a measurement in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}.
(1.4) Alice sends r to Charlie
|r〉 is generated as Eq. (46) and Eq. (47). Further more, all the |rk〉’s genera-
tion in the rest of the scheme is always the same. Alice sends EH(KAC ||r1)(|r〉)⊗
|r1〉 to Charlie. Then Charlie extracts r by performing a measurement in the
computational basis.
(2) The individual blind signature generation and verification phase
In this phase, we pick one of the signatory Ui as the representative who
signs the message.
(2.1) Quantum channel setup
Charlie prepares n+l pairs of EPR particles denoted as {|a(1)〉UiC , |a(2)〉UiC ,
· · · , |a(n+l)〉UiC}, where |a(j)〉UiC = 1√2 (|00〉UiC+|11〉UiC),j = 1, 2, · · · , n+l.
Then he sends the first particle to Ui and keeps the other himself for ev-
ery EPR pair. After Ui receives all particles, Charlie randomly chooses l
particles to perform a measurement randomly in the basis of {|0〉, |1〉} or
{ 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} and reports the position of the particles that
he has measured and the basis that he has chosen to Ui. Ui takes the same
measurement on the corresponding particles and compares the measurement
outcomes with Charlie. If there is no error, the channel is considered to be
safe. Otherwise, they abandon the quantum channel and set it up again.
(2.2) Signature Phase
(2.2.1) Alice sends the information quantum state |ψ(m′)〉M to Ui
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Alice randomly chooses a 4n-bit sequence r2 and computes H(KAUi ||r2).
Then she sends [EH(KAUi ||r2)(|ψ(m′)〉M )] ⊗|r2〉 to Ui.
(2.2.2) Ui signs the message m
Ui decrypts [EH(KAUi ||r2)(|ψ(m′)〉M )] to get |ψ(m′)〉M by first extracting r2
and then computingH(KAUi ||r2). He generates {|ψ(j)〉MUi |j = 1, 2, · · · , n} by
combining each |ψ(j)〉M with his EPR particle. Then Ui performs a Bell basis
measurement on {|ψ(j)〉MUi |j = 1, 2, · · · , n} to get the outcomes {βMUi(j)|j =
1, 2, · · · , n}. According to Eq. (14), βMUi(j) is an Bell state |βkl〉 which can
be expressed in 2-bit classical string according to |βkl〉 −→ kl, k, l ∈ {0, 1}. By
introducing a 4n-bit random binary string Ri, Ui gets the blind signature Si
of m′ as
Si = (βi ⊕KCUi)||H [(βi ⊕KCUi)||Ri] (48)
where
βi = βMUi(1)||βMUi (2)|| · · · ||βMUi (j)|| · · · ||βMUi(n). (49)
(2.2.3) Ui sends |Si〉 to Charlie
Ui transforms Si into quantum state |Si〉 as
|Si〉 =
6n⊗
j=1
|Si(j)〉 (50)
where
|Si(j)〉 =
{
|0〉 if Si(j) = 0
|1〉 if Si(j) = 1.
(51)
Ui randomly chooses a 6 dimensional 4n-bit string vector r3 = (r
1
3 , r
2
3 , r
3
3, r
4
3 ,
r53 , r
6
3) and computes H(KCUi ||r3). Then he sends [EH(KCUi ||r3) (|Si〉)] ⊗ |r3〉
to Charlie where
H(KCUi ||r3) = H(KCUi ||r13)||H(KCUi ||r23)||H(KCUi ||r33) (52)
||H(KCUi ||r43)||H(KCUi ||r53)||H(KCUi ||r63)
and
|r3〉 = |r13〉 ⊗ |r23〉 ⊗ |r33〉 ⊗ |r43〉 ⊗ |r53〉 ⊗ |r63〉. (53)
(2.3) Verification Phase
(2.3.1) Charlie decrypts EH(KCUi ||r3)(|Si〉) to get |Si〉, then he can get S′i
by performing a measurement in computational basis. After that he further
gets β′i based on KCUi according to Eq. (48). Here
S′i = (β
′
i ⊕KCUi)||[H [(βi ⊕KCUi)||Ri]]′ (54)
If there is no incorrection happened in the transmission and measurement, β′i
and S′i will be equal to βi and Si respectively.
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(2.3.2) According to β′i and quantum teleportation in Eq. (14), Char-
lie performs one of the corresponding reverse transformation (I,X, Y, Z) on
each particle in his hand. He obtains the states of these particle denoted as
{|ψ′(j)〉C |j = 1, 2, · · · , n}, which carry information of message m′′.
(2.3.3) Charlie gets m′′ by measuring each |ψ′(j)〉C , j = 1, 2, · · · , n in the
basis of {b|0〉M + c|1〉M , c|0〉M − b|1〉M}. Then he computes m∗ = m′′ ⊕ r and
sends [EH(KBC ||r4)(|m∗〉)]⊗ |r4〉 to Bob.
(2.3.4) Bob decrypts EH(KBC ||r4)(|m∗〉) to get |m∗〉 and further gets m∗
by performing a measurement in the basis of {|0〉, |1〉}. Then he compares m∗
with m. If they are not equal, Si is rejected. Otherwise, Bob informs Charlie
and Ui to announce S
′
i and Ri on the public board, respectively. Then he
computes H [(β′i⊕KCUi)||Ri] and compares it to [H [(βi⊕KCUi)||Ri]]′. If they
are the same, Si is accepted. Otherwise, Si is considered to be compromised
and it is rejected.
(3) The combined multiple signature generation and verification phase
(3.1) Charlie generates the message sequence {m∗i |i = 1, 2, · · · , t} and col-
lects all individual signature {S′i|i = 1, 2, · · · , t}. If m∗i is equals to m∗i+1,
(i = 1, 2, · · · , t−1), he confirms the message and generates the multiple signa-
ture S = {S′i|i = 1, 2, · · · , t}. If not, the process is terminated. After Charlie
confirms the message, he sends [EH(KBC ||r5)(|m∗1〉)]⊗ |r5〉 to Bob.
(3.2) Bob decrypts EH(KBC ||r5)(|m∗1〉) to get |m∗1〉 and further gets m∗1 by
performing a measurement in the basis of {|0〉, |1〉}. Then he compares m∗1
with m. If they are not equal, S is rejected. Otherwise, Bob informs Charlie to
announce S and each Ui(i = 1, 2, · · · , t) to announce Ri on the public board,
respectively. Then he computes F and compares it to F ′ where
F = {H [(β′i ⊕KCUi)||Ri∗ ], i, i∗ = 1, 2, · · · , t} (55)
F ′ = {[H [(βi ⊕KCUi)||Ri]]′, i = 1, 2, · · · , t}. (56)
If F ′ ⊆ F , S is accepted. If not, S is rejected.
Let’s use Figure 1 to illustrate our quantum signature model as follows:
Signature Phase Verification Phase
Alice
Ut
...
U2
U1
Charlie Bob
|ψ(m′)〉M in Step(2.2.1)
✻✻ ✻✻
|r〉 in Step(1.4)
|m〉 in Step(1.3)
|m∗1〉 in Step(2.3.3)
✲|Si〉 in Step(2.2.3)
✲|ϕ(j)〉Ui in Step(2.1)
✚
✚
✚
✚
✚
✚❃
❩
❩
❩
❩
❩
❩⑦
✘✘✘
✘✘✘✿
❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✲
❩
❩
❩
❩
❩
❩⑦
❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏✶
✚
✚
✚
✚
✚
✚❃
⑥
②
❂
✮
✲
❄ ✲
✻
Figure 1. The Quantum Signature Model of The Improved Scheme
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Next, we list the improvements of our new scheme compared to the original
one:
(1) Introducing the improved QOTP encryption algorithm.
(2) Bringing in a hash function to authenticate the originality of the sig-
nature.
(3) The secret keys become reusable by introducing some random strings.
(4) Bringing in public boards.
(5) Classical message is concealed before turning into quantum message.
Meanwhile, the transformation method in the improved scheme is according
to Eq. (43) rather than Eq. (5) in the original one.
(6) The entangled quantum channel between Charlie and each Ui(i =
1, 2, · · · , t) is set up by Charlie rather than Alice. At the same time, a channel
checking process is added to make sure it is secure.
(7) Classical message from Alice to Bob is transmitted through quantum
method in Step (1.3).
5 Cryptanalysis of the improved scheme
In this section, we present the security analysis of the improved scheme. we
show there is no disavowal and forgery in the improved scheme. Meanwhile, we
also point out the signatory cannot learn the signed message and the signed
message cannot be modified by attackers in the improved scheme.
5.1 No disavowal
5.1.1 Each signatory Ui cannot disavow his signature Si
From Eq. (48), we can see that because each Si contains Ui’s secret key KCUi
in the improved scheme, Ui cannot disavow his signature Si. Meanwhile, Ui
cannot disavow Si by the intercept-resend method mentioned in Ref. [21].
Because in Step (2.3.4) Charlie announces Si on the public board instead of
sending it to Bob, which is only for reading on the public board, Ui can’t
disavow his signature by intercept-resend method.
5.1.2 The receiver Bob cannot disavow the signature
In the improved scheme, the signature S is announced on the public board by
Charlie when Bob informs him m = m∗1 in Step (3.2) so that everyone can
witness Bob has received the signature, so Bob can’t disavow his receiving the
signature. Also, Bob can’t disavow the integrity of the signature by claiming
m 6= m∗1 as in Ref. [4]. Assume m = m∗1 and Bob lies to claim m 6= m∗1 for
his own benefit in Step (3.2). We can ask Alice , Charlie and Bob to public
announce the message respectively. Then the dishonest behavior of Bob can
be catught according to the voting rule, on the assumption that there is no
collaborate attack.
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5.2 No forgery
According to Eq. (48), each Si is composed of βi, KCUi and Ri. Here we show
there is no participant forgery and external forgery in the improved scheme.
5.2.1 Alice cannot forge the signature
In the improved scheme, Charlie prepares the EPR pairs {|a(j)〉CUi |j =
1, 2, · · · , n + l}, Alice just prepares the information state |ψ(m′)〉M so that
she cannot get each βi by measuring each |ψ(j)〉MUi directly. Next we show
Alice cannot get βi by intercept-resend method either. Assume Alice intercepts
each |ϕ(j)〉Ui and resends the measurement outcome |βkl〉MUi to Ui. Because
Charlie and Ui performs a checking process in Step (2.1), Alice’s intercept-
resend attack will be discovered. According to the improved scheme, Alice
cannot get βi. KCUi is shared between Charlie and Ui via QKD protocol so
that Alice has no chance to get it. Moreover, Ri is chosen by Ui randomly and
it is not acquired by anyone else until it is announced on the public board so
that Alice cannot get it in the signing phase. Therefore, Alice cannot forge the
signature.
5.2.2 Charlie cannot forge the signature
Charlie, the signature collector who can get each S′i and the secret key KCUi
in the improved scheme, is considered to be most likely to forge the signature
successfully. Here we show he cannot forge the signature either. Charlie can
modify the signature at random and keep the message unchanged when he
has confirmed the message, which has no influence on the following message
comparison. Charlie cannot learn each Ui’s random string Ri. Since he does
not know how to modify H ′[(βi ⊕KCUi)||Ri] to fit his modification determin-
istically, Charlie’s forgery attack can definitely be discovered in Step (3.2).
5.2.3 Bob cannot forge the signature
Bob is the receiver of the scheme, he cannot get the signature S until Charlie
announced it on the public board. Therefore, the only way Bob can modify
the signature is to perform a unitary operator V on EH(KCUi ||r3) (|Si〉) in Step
(2.2.3). According to Eq. (40), Bob’s modification cannot follow his will, then
it will be definitely discovered in the verification process. As a consequence,
Bob cannot forge the signature.
5.2.4 The eavesdropper Eve cannot forge the signature
In the improved scheme, the classical bit m′(j) is transformed into quantum
state according to Eq. (42) and Eq. (43). Here we take a 1-bit message m′(j)
to illustrate any of Eve’s modification on Si(j) can be detected.
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Supposed Si(j) = β01 is replaced with S
′
i(j) = β00 by Eve, the corre-
sponding message are m′(j) and m′′(j) respectively. We present this case as
follows:
(1) Without Eve’s attack:
(1.1) Assume Alice prepares the state |ψ(j)〉M = b|0〉M + c|1〉M and its
signature is Si(j) = β01, according to the teleportation, Charlie’s particle will
be in the state |ϕ(j)〉C = b|1〉C + c|0〉C . Then Charlie performs operation
X on |ϕ(j)〉C to get the state |ψ′(j)〉C = b|0〉C + c|1〉C . After that Charlie
performs a measurement in the basis of {b|0〉M + c|1〉M , c|0〉M − b|1〉M}) to
extract m′(j) = 1.
(1.2) Assume Alice prepares the state |ψ(j)〉M = (c|0〉M − b|1〉M ) and its
signature is Si(j) = β01, according to the teleportation, Charlie’s particle will
be in the state |ϕ(j)〉C = c|1〉C − b|0〉C . Then Charlie performs operation
X on |ϕ(j)〉C to get the state |ψ′(j)〉C = c|0〉C − b|1〉C . After that Charlie
performs a measurement in the basis of {b|0〉M + c|1〉M , c|0〉M − b|1〉M}) to
extract m′(j) = 0.
(2) With Eve’s attack:
(2.1) Assume Alice prepares the state |ψ(j)〉M = b|0〉M + c|1〉M and Eve
replaces Si(j) = β01 with S
′
i(j) = β00, then Charlie’s particle is still in the state
|ϕ(j)〉C = b|1〉C + c|0〉C as Eve’s attack has no effect on it. According to the
teleportation, Charlie will perform operation I on |ϕ(j)〉C to get |ψ′(j)〉C =
b|1〉C + c|0〉C . After that Charlie performs a measurement in the basis of
{b|0〉M + c|1〉M , c|0〉M − b|1〉M}) to extract m′′(j), it will have a probability of
4b2c2 to get m′′(j) = 1 and a probability of c4 + b4 − 2b2c2 to get m′′(j) = 0.
(2.2) Assume Alice prepares the state |ψ(j)〉M = (c|0〉M − b|1〉M ) and Eve
replaces Si(j) = β01 with S
′
i(j) = β00, then Charlie’s particle is still in the
state |ϕ(j)〉C = c|1〉C − b|0〉C . According to the teleportation, Charlie will
perform operation I on |ϕ(j)〉C to get |ψ′(j)〉C = c|1〉C − b|0〉C . After that
Charlie performs a measurement in the basis of {b|0〉M+c|1〉M , c|0〉M−b|1〉M}
to extract m′′(j), it will have a probability of c4+ b4− 2b2c2 to get m′′(j) = 1
and a probability of 4b2c2 to get m′′(j) = 0.
From (1) and (2), we can see that Eve’s modification of the signature can
be discovered in Step (2.3.4) with a non-zero probability. Other cases can be
presented similarly. We can see Eve cannot forge the signature.
5.3 Each Ui cannot learn the signed message
In the improved scheme, the classical message m is turned into m′ = m ⊕ r
before it is transformed into quantum states. If Ui performs a measurement
in the basis of {b|0〉M + c|1〉M , c|0〉M − b|1〉M} on the information quantum
sequence {|ψ(j)〉M |j = 1, 2, · · · , n}, he will just get m′ and has no chance to
get the signed message m. If he wants to learn m, he has to know r which will
be sent from Alice to Charlie in Step (1.4). Because r is turned into |r〉 and
encrypted by KAC according to the quantum one-time pad algorithm during
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its transmission, Ui cannot get the random string r without the key KAC .
Therefore, we know Ui can’t learn the signed message m.
5.4 The signed message m cannot be modified
In the improved scheme, the signed message m is turned into quantum state
|m〉 according to Eq. (44) and Eq. (45) before it is sent from Alice to Bob
in Step (1.3). It is encrypted by H(KAB||r0) according to Eq. (38). Here
we show any attacker without the key KAB cannot modified the message m
by the intercept-resend method. Suppose the attacker wants to modify the
signed message m. He intercepts the [EH(KAB ||r0)(|m〉)] ⊗ |r0〉. Because he
does not get the secret key KAB, the attacker cannot decrypt it directly. Then
he can choose to perform a unitary operator V on [EH(KAB ||r0)(|m〉)] and send
V [EH(KAB ||r0)(|m〉)]⊗|r0〉 to Bob. In order to make sure this modification can
pass the verification, there must exist a non-identity unitary operator U to
satisfy Eq. (40). Because |m〉 is from classical message m according to Eq.
(44) and Eq. (45), here U can be restricted to Pauli operators. Exactly
V [EH(KAB ||r0)(|m〉)] ≡ EH(KAB ||r0)(U |m〉) (57)
U =
n⊗
j=1
Qj
Qj ∈ {I, σx, σy , σz}
The question the attacker has to face now is whether there exist such non-
identity unitary operators U and V to satisfy Eq. (57). Unfortunately, it is
pointed out that there doesn’t exist such U and V for any message |m〉 in
Ref. [52]. Then the modification mentioned above will be discovered in the
verification process.
Next, we show Bob can modify the signed message m at random in the
improved scheme, but we can rebute it by the voting rule when this dispute
takes place. Because Bob has got KAB and KBC , according to the improved
scheme, he can modify m at random and make this modification can pass the
verification. When the dispute on the message m happens between Alice and
Bob, we can ask Alice, Bob and Charlie to public their message and arbitrate
it according to the voting rule on the assumption that they are all just loyal
to themself. From above, we can see the signed message cannot be modified
in the improved scheme.
6 Conclusion.
In this paper, we first gave a security analysis on the quantum broadcasting
multiple blind signature scheme based on teleportation in Ref. [51], which has
recently been proposed. We point out that there are some security loopholes in
the protocol and describe the attack strategies in detail. Then we present an
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improved scheme by introducing hash function, public board, and the improved
QOTP encryption algorithm proposed in Ref. [52]. After that, we show the
improved scheme can resist all the mentioned attacks and that the secret keys
can be reusable by bringing in some random strings. The improved scheme is
more practical and secure. It will have foreseeable applications to E-payment
system, E-business, and E-government.
The improved quantum broadcasting multiple blind signature can only sign
classical message. So it is worthwhile for us to designing a scheme for quantum
messages in the future.
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